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Since the Single European Act the EU has brought many ‘public’ policy sectors 
characterised by heterogeneity under the umbrella of the Single Market. Consequently, 
some of the tools employed to shelter these sectors from supranational governance – 
unanimous decision-making, limited Commission competence, and ‘ring fenced’ national 
regimes – are no longer fully relevant. The member states and the Commission have 
therefore developed a series of additional measures to accommodate heterogeneity. The 
central questions here are: as integration proceeds, what can member states reasonably 
demand in order to safeguard their interests? And, how can the Commission offer the 
necessary flexibility? The literature on policy implementation and differentiated 
integration provides a point of departure for generalisations about changes to mechanisms 
of intergovernmental governance. The present paper uses developments in the EU gas 
sector to explore and elaborate how the adoption of new measures changes the mechanisms 
of intergovernmental governance.   
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Introduction  
Over the last two decades, scholars working on Europeanization of member state’s public 
policy have document broad and continuing variations in policy outcomes across sectors 
and states (Börzel 1999; Radaelli 2000; Olsen 2002; Bulmer 2005; Hayward and Würzel 
2012). Others point to an increase in differentiated integration – the prevalence of formal 
and informal regimes at the EU-level that permit exemptions, opt-outs, delays and 
heterogeneous implementation of EU policy (Stubb 1996; Kölliker 2001, 2006; Andersen 
and Sitter 2006; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). The overall picture that emerges 
from this literature is closer to a mosaic than a painting: it is relatively coherent, but closer 
examination reveals a considerable degree of local variation and pieces that fit together by 
adjustment rather than by design (Andersen 2006). The central questions in this article are: 
as integration proceeds, what can member states reasonably demand to safeguard their 
interests; and how can the Commission offer the necessary flexibility? 
 
The central argument in what follows is that literature cited above allows us to identify 
new developments in four broad sets of mechanisms of intergovernmental governance. i) 
Policy sectors may be kept outside EU competence, but as many new areas are brought in 
under the EU policy-umbrella, opt-outs and derogations have become common. ii) States 
continue to seek compromises in the Council, but as formal and informal veto-rights have 
become obsolete, deliberative decision-making has become more prominent. iii) As the 
Commission’s power has expanded, it has demonstrated increased sensitivity to member 
state policy concerns and willingness to seek pragmatic compromises. iv) Finally, even in 
areas that are brought in under the Single Market, the member states continue to maintain 
and strive to preserve parallel authority and strong policy tools.  
 
Developments in the EU energy sector since the early 1990s, and specifically liberalisation 
of natural gas markets, provides a useful case for exploring and elaborating these new 
trends in the way states pursue and protect their interest. The heterogeneity of the gas sector 
stems not only from the differences between the states’ natural resources, import 
dependency and infrastructure, but also from how they organise their gas markets, down to 
and including asset pricing and accounting rules (Helm 2014). This complexity is 
compounded by the link between gas markets and other policy issues (environment and 
industrial policy) and the strong policy instruments that states possess (finance and 
ownership). The energy sector thus captures a number of features that are common to many 
policies: national diversity, issue complexity, linkages across policy areas, and strong state 
capacity and legitimacy for intervention (Andersen and Sitter 2009; Claes 2009, Eberlein 
2010).  
 
The article is organised in five sections. The first identifies four mechanisms of 
intergovernmental governance, drawing on the existing literature. The next four sections 
explore and elaborate changes in these four mechanisms, using examples from the two-
decade long struggle to liberalise European gas markets. The concluding section argues 
that the EU is set to remain heterogeneous in policy terms. The member states and the 
Commission have found additional ways of maintaining heterogeneity. Far from being a 
threat to European integration, the pragmatism this entails seems to be an essential 
ingredient.  
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Managing Heterogeneity: Old Wine in New Bottles  
The history of European integration is the history of how Europe’s states and institutions 
have sought to manage – rather than reduce – heterogeneity. Both intergovernmental and 
supranational governance represent models for how to do this. The theoretical debates in 
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s very much reflected the practical political challenges of the 
day (Taylor 1996). Early neo-functional theorists (Haas 1958, 1975; Lindberg 1963; 
Coombes 1970) looked to the Commission for supranational leadership; the realist school 
emphasised the importance of member state sovereignty both normatively and positively 
(Hoffmann 1966, 1982; Pinder 1968; Taylor, 1968, 1982, 1983). In practice, the principal 
policy choice was between including a sector in the EEC, or not. The exchange between 
Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) and Moravcsik (1991, 1993) captured the theoretical debate. 
With the adoption of the Single Euroepan Act, debate among practitioners increasingly 
turned to the mix between intergovernmental and supranational governance rather than a 
choice between two distinct models.  
 
The second half of the 1990s and the 2000s saw a broad shift in integration theory and 
analyses of EU governance, perhaps best summed up in Wessels’ (1997, 2005) theory of 
fusion between national and EU level policy. Many recent theorists focus on governance 
rather than integration theory. This took place at a time of extensive ‘deepening and 
widening’; and a practical search for new ways of accommodating heterogeneity though 
for example the Open Method of Coordination, more intense bilateral diplomacy, and 
informal policy coordination in sector-based networks. Sabel and Zeitlin (2008) labelled 
the resulting system as ‘experimentalist governance’, consisting of EU-level framework 
goals and metrics; states’ elaboration of plans for meeting these; reporting, monitoring and 
peer-review of results; and periodical revision of the framework goals. The age-old tension 
between EU-level authority and states’ autonomy is no longer so much a matter of an 
either/or dilemma, but rather of a pragmatic search for compromises that are compatible 
with both EU law and national policy concerns.   
 
The recent literature on EU governance features a wide variety of observations and insight 
about how member states seek to safeguard their interests and how the Commission offers 
a degree of flexibility. Scholars working on Europeanization (Börzel 1999; Radaelli 2000; 
Goetz and Hix 2000; Olsen 2002; Bulmer 2005) are primarily interested in how the 
member states adapt to the EU. However, adaptation need not imply policy convergence, 
because outcomes depend on how national actors and institutions respond (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002; Lodge 2002; Knill 2005). Many have documented broad and continuing 
variations across sectors and states (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Hayward and Würzel 
2012), including scholars working on differentiated integration (Dyson and Sepos 2010). 
The latter point out that this is not only a matter of how states react to a given EU policy; 
states can also demand flexible policy regimes with room for national manoeuvre in the 
first place (Stubb 1996; Kölliker 2001, 2006). Indeed, the Commission may even offer it, 
in order to secure legitimacy and local support for implementation (Andersen and Sitter 
2006; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). 
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Across almost all EU policy areas there are, and have always been, elements of 
intergovernmental governance. Striking an acceptable balance between supranational 
authority and state autonomy involves four challenges: i) to delineate EEC/EU authority; 
ii) to reach compromises between the states; iii) to restrain the influence of the 
supranational institutions; and iv) to ring-fence member state authority in sectors that are 
partially covered by EEC/EU rules. The principal tools that states have used – and still use 
– to maintain control of EEC/EU policy developments include formal arrangements such 
as the exclusion of a policy area from the EEC, legislation by unanimity in the Council, 
limits to the power or authority of to the Commission and the Court, as well as informal 
rules such as the Luxembourg Compromise and norms such as the Commission’s self-
restraint. The literature discussed above points to a series of new and additional measure 
for intergovernmental governance; such as i) formal and informal opt-outs and derogations; 
ii) new forms of deliberation and compromise; iii) the supranational institutions’ 
receptiveness and sensitivity towards national concerns; and iv) the preservation of parallel 
state-level policy domains.  
 
Until the Single European Act, the member states used four mechanisms (linked to the four 
challenges above) to pursue and protect their interests. These were based on a clear 
distinction between supranational and intergovernmental governance. The SEA brought 
about a departure from both formal (through voting rules) and informal (through the 
Luxembourg Compromise) unanimity in the Council. This was reinforced by the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the ‘public turn’ as the Single Market was gradually extended to 
cover public services (including utilities). As a result, the mechanisms for 
intergovernmental rule were gradually extended in ways that blurred the distinctions 
between supranational and intergovernmental policy-making. This trend can be briefly 
summarised as follows:  
 
i) The first mechanism – limiting the scope of EU competences: before the SEA 
the delineation of EU authority was relatively clear and precise. A large number 
of policy sectors were simply excluded from EEC competence, or handled in 
purely intergovernmental forums. From the Maastricht Treaty and onwards, a 
new solution to the problem of limiting the reach of the EU was found in the 
form of derogations, opt-outs and opt-ins.  
 
ii) The second mechanism – consensual decision-making: the main pre-SEA tool 
for consensual decision-making was unanimity or near-unanimity. With the 
increased use of majority voting among a bigger number of member states, 
intense and prolonged deliberation assumed a more prominent role in policy-
making. Delegation of authority to forums populated by national actors, such 
as regulatory agencies, became more common as arenas for deliberation and 
consensual decision-making.  
 
iii) The third mechanism – the power, preferences and strategies of the 
Commission: the EEC model assumed that the states (as principals) exerted 
some ex-ante and ex-post control over the Commission’s ambitions (as an 
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agent), and that the latter consistently pushed for further integration. Since the 
mid-1990s, the Commission has adopted a more pragmatic stance toward 
understanding, sharing and accommodating member state preferences.  
 
iv) The fourth mechanism – parallel state authority: in the EEC, the member states 
retained control over many policy areas because they were responsible for 
implementation and had several policy tools not available to the Commission. 
The Single Market project did not change this as radically as many had 
expected. The extension of EU competence to additional policy sectors often 
allows states to preserve considerable control over implementation, and to 
maintain parallel policy domains in the sense that they can regulate, finance and 
even exert control though ownership as long as this does not violate Single 
Market rules 
 
In what follows, we substantiate these claims about new or additional mechanisms for 
intergovernmental governance. The EU gas market liberalisation is used to illustrate the 
processes by which such mechanisms developed, change, and work in practice.  
 
The First Mechanism: Limiting the Scope of EU Competence  
The first mechanism traditionally aimed simply to keep a policy sector outside the reach of 
EEC/EU competence. Before the SEA and Maastricht, this was the case with many policy 
areas that states considered strategic and sensitive – notably defence, security, foreign 
policy, police and judicial cooperation, economic and monetary policy, and ‘flanking 
areas’ such as social, health and environment policy. The same was the case for the energy 
sector before 1992. Although energy was always at the heart of European economic 
integration, and was one of the sectors listed in the Treaty of Rome, it was generally 
considered a major policy failure for the EU until the late 1990s (CEC 1988; Padgett 1992; 
Weyman-Jones 1997, Usherwood 1998, van Oostvoorn and Boots 1999; Andersen 2001).  
 
At the time of the Treaty of Rome, shortly after the 1956 Suez crisis, the member states 
were too concerned about security of supply to allow the newly formed Commission to 
take initiatives in this area. Although the states eventually accepted the Commission’s 
guidelines and strategy for energy policy, they by and large ignored its proposals in the 
1960s and 1970s. The 1973-74 oil crisis only served to reinforce the states’ focus on 
security of supply and national policy tools. As McGowan (1990:247) concluded: “The 
Commission had succeeded in establishing a place in energy policy making, but it was far 
from being central to member states’ energy policy agendas.” In line with this, the 
emerging natural gas markets in member states were characterised by monopolies, 
widespread state ownership, and long-term ‘take-or-pay’ contracts designed to secure 
supply and protect consumers. The only exception was Thatcher’s reform agenda in the 
UK. The Commission’s White Paper on Energy (CEC 1988) concluded that the gas market 
practices represented a counter-culture to the values laid down in the SEA (Andersen 
1993).  
 
From the inception of the EEC until the early 1990s, member states’ energy policies were 
thus strongly embedded in national policy paradigms with a statist orientation. The 
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successful establishment of the Single European Market prompted expectations that the 
liberal market regime would be extended to the gas sector. It soon became evident that this 
process was fraught with difficulties. What followed was characterised by a confrontation 
between supranational and intergovernmental logic of decision-making. The 
Commission’s 1990 energy market proposal reflected a strategy for deregulation and 
liberalisation. However, with the exception of the UK, all the member states opposed this 
(Lyons 1994; Stern 1998). The next two years saw extraordinary strong opposition. As 
Stern put it: “many of the established actors in European gas industries […] regarded the 
introduction of liberalization as the equivalent of the end of civilization” (1998:91). 
However, discussion on the natural gas directive was kept alive by the Commission. Its 
legitimacy rested partly on the earlier commitments by the member states to the principles 
of the Single Market, and partly on the introduction of state-level privatisation and 
liberalisation processes. Over time, the well-established mechanism of simply excluding 
gas markets from the reach the Single Market gave way to a search for new ways of 
combing liberalisation with strong state interest and policy tools in the sector.  
 
The new measures designed to limit the reach of the EU regime includes opt-outs and 
arrangements that permit a subset of member states to pursue closer integration (or at least 
a common policy regime). The debates over the gas directive illustrate this mechanisms at 
work. The main controversy was market opening (Ross 1995:180, Stern 1998; Arentsen 
2004): how much of the gas market should be opened for competition, and who should 
have the right to send gas through transmission lines? The solution was minimum 
thresholds for liberalisation, which permitted some states to go much further (EP/CEU 
1998). The proposal also introduced the concept of regulated third party access to pipelines, 
with an EU-level regulatory authority. This became the major source of controversy in the 
years to come, because it threatened what had so far been the exclusive right of the pipeline 
owners. Another major issue concerned the impact of liberalisation on long-term contracts 
(take-or pay) that traditionally had been a key instrument to secure investments and long 
term supplies in the gas sector. Several states, led by France, wanted the possibility to 
impose special obligations (equal price, supply security, environmental protection etc.) on 
suppliers (Petroleum Economist 1995). A final issue concerned the need to establish 
separate markets for production, import, transmission and distribution in the gas market 
(labelled ‘unbundling’), which had hitherto been ‘bundled’ by monopolies. 
 
Resolving these issues involved intense efforts on the parts of both the states and the 
Commission – particularly the Energy Commissioner – to preserve a degree of national 
autonomy in energy policy that would be compatible with an EU-level market-based model 
(Andersen and Sitter 2009, Helm 2014). The first directive on the liberalization, in 1998, 
opened up for an alternative to the pre-existing monopolised system. However, the direct 
and immediate requirements of the directive were limited. Pragmatic flexibility was built 
into the new directive through a number of new measures: gradual liberalisation and 
multiple models of compliance. This entailed a step-by-step approach, including minimum 
targets and member state choice on matters such as regulated or negotiated pipeline access, 
eligible customers and unbundling of commercial functions (EP/CEU 1998; CEC 2000). 
In short, national regulatory efforts and new market strategies became increasingly 
important in providing the content and pace of market liberalisation. The emerging EU-
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level policy would have been impossible without the Commission’s persistent push, but in 
the end it allowed ample room for the interests and strategies of member states and their 
industries. Consequently national solutions varied considerably, and were still acceptable 
and deemed to fall within the general model. 
 
 
The Second Mechanism: Consensual Decision-Making    
The second intergovernmental mechanism is decision-making by sunanimity or consensus 
by the member states, traditionally in the Council. The informal version of this mechanism 
came in 1966 in the shape of the Luxembourg Compromise, an agreement between the 
member states that they would refrain from outvoting a state if issues of vial national 
importance were at stake. This has gradually been abandoned as far as the Single Market 
is concerned. Nevertheless, there are many examples (also in the gas sector) of the Council 
seeking compromises that go well beyond the minimum winning coalition required for a 
decision by qualified majority voting rules. Indeed, in general, most formal votes indicate 
one or more member states’ desire to have their position recorded for domestic politics 
motives, rather than real decision-making by vote (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; 
Hayes-Renshaw, van Aken and Wallace 2006). While deliberation has always been a 
central feature of decision-making among the member states, some scholars (Lewis 2000, 
Puetter 2003, 2014) point to a pattern of more intense interaction between governments. 
They demonstrate that debates regularly continue not only until a consensus solution is 
found, but also that these very processes of deliberation help generate common norms 
(Puetter 2003:115). 
 
The 1998 directive was the product of prolonged discussions, over several years, and 
resulted in a compromise acceptable to all fifteen member states and the Commission (and 
the Parliament). However, it also pointed to another measure designed to ensure consensus 
in the EU-level follow-up stages. It envisaged that the Commission’s regulatory role would 
be carried out in partnership with national regulatory authorities. Most states established 
independent regulators for gas, with different degrees of political discretion and/or shared 
competence with competition authorities; the Commission was expected to co-ordinate 
national regulators. The establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Operators (ACER), which became operational in March 2011, involved a newer form of 
delegation to the EU (Cohen and Thatcher 2008; Tarrant and Kelemen 2011). This replaced 
the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas. It involves ‘double delegation’ in 
the sense that the member states have delegated tasks first to the Commission and the 
national regulatory agencies, and it is these organisations that are in turn represented in 
ACER. Its tasks primarily involve monitoring and reporting (e.g. the operation of the 
internal market, reviewing national rules), drafting (e.g. framework guidelines) and issuing 
opinions and recommendations (e.g. on network codes, technical rules); but it has decision-
making powers over cross-border issues in the event that national regulators fail to agree 
or they ask for ACER intervention, on exemptions for new interconnectors, and on 
technical issues related to the third energy package (a series of five directives on electricity 
and gas regulation adopted in 2009, including EP/CEU 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
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This institutional set-up represents a new context for deliberation and efforts to hammer 
out policy compromises that all member states can live with. As Wilks (2005) has shown, 
this happens with national regulators when they meet in European regulatory networks to 
thrash out common operational guidelines. For example, competition authorities agree on 
which economic models to use in policy analysis. An additional element in deliberative 
policy making is thus the delegation of power to networks of national regulatory agencies 
(Kohler-Koch and Eisinger 1999; Majone 2005). Delegation of authority reflects 
awareness about possible unforeseen consequences down the line. Institutions dominated 
by the member states and their regulatory agencies provide a space for flexible and 
differentiated national responses.  
 
Indeed, the delegation to networks of state-level actors in the gas sector reflected 
anticipation of conflicts about operational rules. This was a new tool for indirect national 
control in the gas sector, consistent with EU regulation and competition law. At the policy 
level, the Commission continues to push for a more integrated homogeneous market; but 
at the organisational level, the structure, mandate, competences and resources of national 
regulatory agencies vary considerably. Unsurprisingly, so does implementation (CEC 
2010). This strategy of consensual agreement on general frameworks for gas regulation, 
combined with strategic and technical uncertainty, is very much compatible with the key 
elements in ‘experimentalist’ policy-making (Eberlein 2010). In this model progress is 
achieved through recurrent evaluations and policy adjustments that gradually align 
practical policies in the sector with the general framework and thus reduce heterogeneity 
over time. However, new challenges have arisen in the form of linkages between gas and 
other policy areas, notably security of supply and the environment (Helm 2014). Thus, at 
the same time as the EU manages heterogeneity with respect to gas markets, these 
unanticipated challenges involve even more heterogeneity.   
 
 
The Third Mechanism: The Power, Preferences and Strategies of the Commission 
 
In addition to the disciplining effect of the Commission knowing that the Council might 
rejects it proposal, another long-established mechanism whereby states protect their 
interests in the EEC/EU comes in the form of limiting the power of the Commission and 
efforts to shape its interests. Examples include appointments to the Commission and early 
consultations on policy initiatives. The Commission’s radical gas (and electricity) 
liberalisation proposal of 1990 represented an example of an activist Commission pushing 
the limits of these restraints. This happened with the support of the UK, and in the context 
of a broad consensus on the idea of extending the reach of the Single Market. But it but 
generated a strong backlash from the other member states. Two significant developments 
followed. First, in 1994 the European Council gave the Commission uncommonly precise 
guidelines for how to proceed. Second, in 1995-98 the Commission experienced 
considerable internal debate about how far to accommodate member state and industry 
interests (Andersen 2001). 
 
In the following decade the Commission pursued a mixed strategy: it accommodated 
member state concerns, while at the same time pushing a liberalising agenda. It also 
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engaged in a strategy of building coalitions with state-level actors, notably firms and 
regulators. Competition Commissioner Leon Brittan (and his successor Karel van Miert) 
led the argument for a rapid process under then Article 90 (now Article 106 of the Lisbon 
Treaty), which permitted the Commission to unilaterally issue directives breaking up 
monopolies, while Energy Commissioner Antonio Cardoso e Cunha (and his successor 
Christos Papoutsis) arguing for a more cautious approach (Ross 1995:180; van Miert 
1994). Opposition centred on security of supply, the fear that small consumers might have 
to bear the costs of competition, and arguments that liberalisation would require a large 
degree of regulation (Weyman-Jones 1997:563). The outcome was the above-cited 
compromise directive of 1998. The follow-up gas directive in 2003 (EP/CEU 2003) 
required that that all states adopt a regulated access tariff, and establish independent 
regulators. Non-discriminatory third party access should be developed through legal 
unbundling of transport from trading services. At the time, only the UK was judged to have 
completed market opening in the gas sector. A third round of proposed directives followed 
in 2007, leading to the adoption of the third energy liberalisation package in 2009. The 
latter focussed on ownership unbundling, new regimes for independent systems operators 
or independent transmission operators, as well as an effort to strengthen national regulators 
and establish a new EU regulatory agency. However, unbundling was delayed in most 
states.  
 
The gradual liberalisation of the gas sector illustrates the operation of the mechanisms of 
state control by limiting the Commission’s power and influencing its policy preferences. 
This may simply be a matter of the Commission pragmatically accommodating the member 
states’ preferences. However, it can also involve real policy reorientation. In case of energy 
liberalisation in the mid-1990s, the Commissioners responsible for competition and energy 
for a long time defended diametrically opposed positions. The fact that the Commission 
experienced internal debate, made it easier for it to change its position. In this case, 
although the Commission had the power unilaterally to break up national monopolies – 
which it had exercised successfully on more than one occasion in the telecoms sector – it 
prioritised a workable compromise over the pursuit of further integration. This is far from 
the only case where it has departed from the persistent and forceful pro-integration 
stereotype documented in earlier studies (Nugent 1997, Page 2012: chapter 7). 
 
Even today, a considerable gap remains between the Commission’s policy aim of 
liberalised markets and the realities on the ground. The main challenge remains the ability 
of incumbent firms (some of which are state owned) to limit access to national gas markets. 
The Commission’s way of dealing with this challenge has evolved: it now takes a more 
pragmatic approach than in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Integration does not necessarily 
require increased supranational authority and homogeneity in terms of market structures, 
but rather better coordination and accommodation of heterogeneity. Indeed, the 
introduction of a new regulator was an attempt to deal with heterogeneity, rather than do 
away with it. To be sure, the Commission’s report (CEC 2010) concluded with the not-so-
veiled threat that if needed “the Commission will not limit its actions to energy regulation 
and will not hesitate to use its powers under competition law.” The actual policy outcome 
– which can be labelled ‘fuzzy liberalization’ (Andersen and Sitter 2009) – at first glance 
seems to violate the assumption of an ever more homogeneous European market implicit 
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in much of the literature on integration theory. However, the point here is the opposite: 
integration may well be impossible without a certain degree of fuzziness.  
 
 
The Fourth Mechanism: Parallel State Authority   
The fourth and final mechanism widely used to ensure member state control of public 
policy is the operation of autonomous policy regimes at the state level. In important public 
policy areas, such as education, health, welfare, and law enforcement, the member states 
have successfully maintained their autonomy and control (see for example Wallace, 
Wallace and Webb 1983; Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein 2001, Hayward and Würzel 
2012). This is also the case with an important part of the energy sector: the ability to 
determine the energy mix, control the extraction of natural resources (e.g. shale gas), and 
ensure security of supply (e.g. building terminal for Liquefied Natural Gas to reduce the 
dependence on Russian supplies). In other words, whilst the EU regulates the gas market, 
the states also maintain at their disposal polity tools such as investment, state ownership of 
industry and the regulation of natural resources. The extension of the Single Market to the 
gas sector has done little to erode the effectiveness of these policy tools and this boundary 
between EU-level and national authority.  
 
Even when the EU extended its authority over the gas sector, it made allowances for 
parallel authority at the state level. An important measure in the 1998 gas directive was the 
delegation of regulation of third-party access to pipelines to the national level. Companies 
could apply to national authorities for exemption from the third party access rules in cases 
of serious economic and financial problems; public service obligations allowed for national 
protection of vulnerable customers, protection of final customers’ rights, social and 
economic cohesion, environmental protection and security of supply (CEC 2001). The 
directive contained very few supranational regulations, and preserved considerable 
freedom for states to regulate national markets in the future (Stern 1998; Arentsen 2004; 
Haase 2008). In Stern’s words (1998: xviii), the member states accepted “both the principle 
of access to (pipeline) networks, and the assurance that opponents of competition and 
liberalisation cannot indefinitely procrastinate in the opening up of their gas markets.” At 
the same time the Commission accepted the establishment of new organisations and policy 
tools at the state level that all but guaranteed heterogeneous implementation.  
 
The mechanism of parallel state authority is perhaps the most varied of the four 
mechanisms discussed here. It amounts to the operation of national regimes in parallel to 
the EU regime. In social policy, this is formally acknowledged in the shape of the Open 
Method of Coordination (Chalmers and Lodge 2003), in foreign and security policy EU 
initiatives are fully dependent on the capacities of the states (Howorth 2011, Norheim-
Martinsen 2012). Even in the core Single Market sectors the states retain very important 
policy tools. In the gas sector, as in other sectors where the state is a key provider of public 
goods, increased integration becomes a question of how two parallel policy levels operate 
in tandem. Article 194 in the Lisbon Treaty provides a clear illustration of this: whilst 
energy policy is an EU competence, its “measures shall not affect a member state’s right 
to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.” 
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A number of other rules have been developed to allow member states to maintain some 
form of control over their domestic gas markets, perhaps most famously in the shape of the 
so called ‘Gazprom clause’ that was written into the third energy package in 2009 (EP/CEU 
2009a, Article. 11). This clause permits member states to take into account security of 
supply risks when they vet and certify third-country firms’ acquisitions, ownership and 
operation of gas transportation networks. In a similar vein, the Commission has supported 
a series of pipeline initiatives by member state governments and national champions 
designed to increase diversity of external supply routes, such as Nord Stream and Nabucco. 
The Commission’s approval of Nord Stream offers a good illustration of its appreciation 
of member states’ efforts to increase security of supply through government-sponsored 
bilateral deals – in parallel to the EU’s overall market-based approach. The Commission 
could also point to diversification of supply routes as an EU-level public good, worthy of 
support. Although it can hardly exercise policy tools related to ownership and finance, the 
EU thus supports the member states’ capacity to do so in their quest for energy security 
(Goldthau and Sitter 2014).  
 
 
Conclusion: Pragmatism and Power-Sharing in the EU  
 
European integration has always confronted four questions: what should it cover, how do 
states give their assent, how much power should the Commission have, what competences 
should be left at the state level even in integrated policy areas? Until the Single European 
Act, the member states use four broad mechanisms to pursue and protect their interests: 
issues were kept out of the reach of the EC; they agreed not to outvote each other in the 
Council; they limited the powers of the Commission; and they sought to preserve their 
policy tools and authority in key sectors. The central theme in this article has been how 
theses mechanisms of intergovernmentalism developed after the SEA, as the Single 
European Market was extended to new policy areas.  
 
Our starting point was the literature on Europeanization of member state’s public policy 
and differentiated integration. A range of studies have documented new measures whereby 
states try to pursue and protect their interests in areas where the EU has expanded its 
competence. This literature provides a basis for some generalisations as to how 
intergovernmental decision-making and authority has evolved over the last two decades. 
We have organised these tools and measures according to the four broad mechanisms of 
intergovernmental governance, to explore how the tools and measures associated with each 
mechanisms have change over time. As the reach of the EU widened to include sectors that 
had previously been insulated from the EU, opt-outs, minimum targets and derogations 
have become common. As the Council has moved to qualified majority voting and the 
Luxembourg Compromises faded away, consensus is pursued by deliberation and 
delegation to bodies populated by national regulators. As the power of the Commission has 
been extended, it has also demonstrated sensitivity to member state’s concerns, even when 
they jar with the logic of the Single Market. Moreover, and perhaps unexpectedly, the 
member states have been able to retain considerable parallel authority even in sectors that 
have become an integral part of the Single Market.  
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The liberalisation of the EU gas market has involved many of the kind of challenges that 
characterise the extension of the Single Market to sectors that were earlier seen as too 
challenging because of their political salience and the heterogeneity of the member states. 
For many governments, gas policy has important industrial policy, welfare and public 
service implications. For some, it is not only a public good, but also has a strong strategic 
dimension. Moreover, even today, the different national institutional arrangements for gas 
markets developed before the SEA are clearly visible. Although the sectors into which the 
EU has expanded since the SEA (e.g. education, health, welfare, and law enforcement) do 
not all share all of these characteristics, each is sensitive to encroachment from the EU in 
its own way. Because the gas sector captures many of the sensitivity issues that member 
states face, it provides a suitable case for exploring how the measures and tools that make 
up each of the four mechanisms evolve and how they work in practice.  
 
Our analysis of developments in the gas sector is rooted in the differentiated integration 
literature, and lends support to the model of ‘experimentalist governance’ developed by 
Zeitlin and Sabel (2008, 2010): the elaboration of EU-level framework goals, followed by 
states’ plans for meeting these, monitoring of results, and periodical revisions. The 
directives involved in the liberalisation of the gas sector are typical examples of such 
recurrent policy cycles. Each successive directive addressed points that were deliberately 
left vague, or altogether omitted from, the earlier version. However, in addition, a major 
finding here is that not only did the content of the directives change, but we also witnessed 
the development of new tools and measure for managing the tensions between the EU 
framework goals and the concerns of individual member states. To the extent that these 
developments alter the mechanisms whereby states pursue and protect their interests, they 
change the nature of intergovernmental governance in the EU.  
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